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THE RIGHT TO MOVEMENT AND TRAVEL
ABROAD: SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE
U.N. DELIBERATIONS*
VED P. NANDA**
The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has again postponed,
until its 28th Session in 1972, the consideration of the item
pertaining to "discrimination in respect of the right of every-
one to leave any country, including his own, and to return
to his country."' It should, however, be noted that for several
years now such postponement has become a routine practice
with the Commission,2 for almost eight years have lapsed
since the major U.N. study on the subject was completed.
3
This study had offered specific proposals for national and
international action to ensure freedom and nondiscrimination
to an individual in the enjoyment of his right to movement
and travel abroad.4 In addition, the study had proposed a
draft declaration of principles "which could exercise persuasive
force and moral authority by virtue of their adoption by a
competent organ of the United Nations."
'5
Since no U.N. action has yet been taken to study and imple-
ment these proposals, this lack of enthusiasm demonstrates that
the right to travel abroad is not a top priority item. Nonethe-
less, it is one of those basic human rights, the universal recog-
nition of which is likely to be a major accomplishment in ac-
cepting the importance of the individual as a subject of inter-
national law. Moreover, its importance is not confined merely
to theoretical formulation and studies, for in various real life
settings, the extent to which the right is recognized, as well
as the nature of state limitations upon it, might have a pro-
h is an adapted version of a paper presented at the World Peace
Through Law Conference in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, July, 1971.
"Professor, College of Law, University of Denver. Director, International
Legal Studies Program. The author gratefully acknowledges the research
assistance of Britt Anderson, a second year student at the University of
Denver College of Law.
1 The decision was taken at the 1136th meeting of the Commission, held
on March 25, 1971. See UNECOSOC, Fiftieth Session, Agenda item 5(a),
Summary Report of the Commission on Human Rights on its twenty-
seventh session, U.N. Doc. E/4949/ Summary, 1. April 1971, at 13.
2 See eg., UNECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, 27th Session, Note
by the Secretary-General: Study of Discrimination in Respect of the
Right to Everyone to Leave any Country, Including His Own, and to
Return to His Country, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1042, 6 November 1970 [here-
inafter cited as 1970 Note by the Secretary-General], at 2-3.
3Jose D. Ingles, Study of Discrimination in Respect of the Right of
Everyone to Leave Any Country, Including His Own, and to Return to
His Country, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4.Sub.2/220/Rev.1 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as Ingles report].
4 Id., at 67-70.
5 Id.. at 64-67.
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found impact upon individuals and groups. For instance, recent
alleged Soviet restrictions on the Jews wishing to emigrate
from the U.S.S.R., and the subsequent demonstrations and mass
meetings in several countries with claims and counter-claims on
the existence and the recognition of said right,6 point to the
seriousness of the situation.
Thus despite previous inaction the subject is of such sig-
nificance so as not to be dismissed or even slighted. As such,
this paper will briefly examine (1) the nature of the right as
enunciated in the U.N. instruments; (2) the scope and impli-
cations of this right; (3) major problems likely to be en-
countered in the implementation of the right; and (4) state
practices in recognizing and limiting the right. The paper will
conclude with a section on appraisal and recommendations.
I. THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT AS RECOGNIZED IN THE
U.N. INSTRUMENTS
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, promulgated
on December 10, 1948, enunciates the right in article 13(2): "the
right of everyone to leave any country, including his own, and
to return to his country."'7 This right, in fact, can be read as an
extension of the right enunciated earlier: "Everyone has the
right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders
of each state."'8 Several other articles of the Declaration have
an important bearing on this right.9 For instance, article 9 pro-
vides that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, deten-
tion or exile." 10 Article 14(1) provides that everyone has the
right "to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution."'" Article 15(1) provides that everyone has the
right to a nationality"2 and article 15(2) provides: "No one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right
to change his nationality.'
u3
One could, of course, argue that the principles set forth
in the Universal Declaration reflect merely the "oughtness"
6 See, e.g., New York Times, March 6, 1971, at 14, col. 3; id., March 11,
1971, at 9, col. 1; id., March 30, 1971, at 14, col. 5; id., March 31, 1971,
at 10, col. 1; id., April 5, 1971, at 16, col. 1; id., June 1, 1971, at 34, col.
7; id., June 22, 1971, at 3, col. 2; id., June 24, 1971, at 2, col. 3; id., June
26, 1971, at 3, col. 5; id., July 14, 1971, at 3, col. 1; TIME, May 31, 1971,
at 39.
7 See U.N. Office of Public Information, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights: A Standard of Achievement, U.N. Publ. No. 62.1.9
[hereinafter cited as Universal Declaration], at 35.
8 Id., Article 13 (1).
9 See Ingles report, at 9-12.
10 Universal Declaration, supra note 7, at 35.
11 Id.
12 Id., at 36.
13 Id.
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and are not enforceable.1 4 But with the adoption by the General
Assembly on December 16, 1966, of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Optional Proto-
col to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, these prin-
ciples have been transformed into enforceable international ob-
ligations. Article 12, paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights affirm the right to travel: ". .. 2.
Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
... 4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter
his own country." 15
As early as 1952, however, the Sub-Commission on Preven-
tion of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights initiated a study on the right set
forth in article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration.16 Subse-
quently approved by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
and the Economic and Social Council, the Sub-Commission
conducted a global study "with respect to all the grounds of
discrimination [in respect of the right of everyone as provided
in article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration] condemned by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights .... -17 The study,
which was carried out by Jose Ingles as the Special Rapporteur
of the Sub-Commission, took three years to complete (1960 to
1963), and contains valuable information on pertinent state prac-
tices. It also contains specific recommendations to ensure the
"full enjoyment" of this right. As mentioned earlier, the Com-
mission has not had occasion thus far to study the proposals
and recommendations contained in the Ingles report.
However, in 1963, a U.N. Conference on International Travel
and Tourism, which met in Rome (from August 21, 1963 to
September 5, 1963) and was attended by 87 states and several
inter-governmental and non-governmental international organ-
izations, considered the question pertaining to freedom of
movement in the light of the Ingles report. While the Con-
ference noted the suggestion that "freedom of travel from
country to country should be the inalienable right of all," 18
14 But see id., at 12-32.
35 See Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during its 21st ses-
sion, 20 September-20 December, 1966, U.N. General Assembly Official
Records, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 (A/6316) [hereinafter cited as 1966
Gen. Ass. resolutions], at 49, 54.
16 Ingles' report, at 74.
17 Id., at 75.
1s See U.N. Conference on International Travel and Tourism (Rome, 21
August-5 September, 1963), Recommendations on International Travel
and Tourism, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 47/18 (1964), at 29.
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and recognized "however, that such a rule could not apply uni-
versally at the present stage," it nevertheless added that "its
implementation should be the aim of all countries, and the
Conference recommends that governments should, wherever
possible, avoid any kind of activity hostile to tourism and based
on arguments of a religious, racial or political nature. The Con-
ference asked that its opinion on that point be communicated
to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights."'19
The general resolution by the Conference affirmed the ideal,
expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that
everyone has the right to freedom of movement, including
freedom of transit, and takes note of the report by the Com-
mission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, on the right of
everyone to leave any country, including his own, and to re-
turn to his country.
20
It recommended that governments should "prevent, in the field
of tourism, any campaign of denigration or discrimination based
on religious, racial or political grounds."' -2 The Conference fur-
ther recommended that "travel for educational, scientific, cul-
tural or official purposes should be specifically encouraged and
facilitated.
22
A notable recognition of the right is contained in article 5
of the 1967 International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination which obligates states parties
to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to
race, color or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the
law, notably in the enjoyment of the right to leave any country,
including one's own, and to return to one's country.
In addition, several international instruments have recog-
nized these rights.23 The most noteworthy in this context are:
(1) the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees;
(2) the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons; and (3) the 1961 U.N. Convention on the Elimination
or Reduction of Future Statelessness. The following provisions
of these conventions have a direct bearing on the right under
consideration: article 28 of the 1951 Convention on Refugees
obligates contracting parties to issue travel documents to refu-
gees within their territory, especially to the ones who are un-
able to secure such documents from the state of their lawful
residence; article 28 of the 1954 Convention on Stateless Persons
11) Id.
20 Id., at 20.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See generally Ingles report, at 5-7.
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similarly obligates the contracting parties to issue travel docu-
ments to stateless persons lawfully within their territory, while
paragraph 13 of the Schedule to the Convention entitles a state-
less person who is the recipient of a travel document under
article 28 to re-enter the territory of the issuing state at any
time during the period of the validity of the document; the
1961 Convention contains several provisions to ensure that de-
parting nationals do not lose their nationality on racial, ethnic,
religious or political grounds, unless they have in the mean-
time acquired another nationality.
It should be also mentioned that both the 1961 Vienna Con-
vention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relations contain special provisions allowing
persons enjoying diplomatic and consular privileges and im-
munities respectively and members of their families to leave
the territory of the receiving state, even when armed conflict is
in progress.
Finally, various regional and bilateral arrangements aimed
at easing border requirements and facilitating international
travel are also in existence. Of special note are articles 2-4 of
the Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights
which embody, inter alia, the principles that everyone is free
to leave any country, including his own, and that no one is to
be deprived of the right to return to his country.
II. SCOPE AND IMPLICATIONS
The right to movement and travel abroad as expressed in
article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is
fairly comprehensive. It encompasses such diverse groups as
tourists, refugees, immigrants and emigrants and stateless per-
sons as well as those citizens within a state who are forced to
remain there due to discriminatory practices. But while the
right is broad, its scope in the light of past and present applica-
tions appears to be severely restricted.
Limitations are inherent, due to the stated exceptions (na-
tional security, public health and morals, safety, legal and mili-
tary obligations and the public order)2 4 and the reaction of
nation states to what they might perceive to be an infringement
upon matters within their domestice jurisdiction. Notwithstand-
ing some serious challenges to the sovereignty of the nation
state, a state's right and power to control its internal affairs is
-4 1966 Gen. Ass. Resolutions, at 49-54.
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still widely accepted.25 Thus while the individual claims the
right to international movement, the state claims the right to
Impose certain restrictions.
Accepted state restrictions include such activities as limiting
travel to members of subversive organizations, 2" immigration
policies seeking "skilled" employees, 21 and the imposition of
medical and health qualifications.28 However, if the right were
to be interpreted literally, cause might exist for increased con-
cern over its possible application to population shifts.
This concern is already being expressed with regard to
social tension that urban areas have experienced in connection
with immigration policies.2 Thus in deciding future application
of 13(2) it is important that a balance be achieved in immigra-
tion policies between the social costs incurred and the profits
received in both developing and developed nations. Beyond this
economic balance are also problems of national identity. A
homogeneous population is desired by many states as a means
of achieving identity and reducing cultural tensions. But, while
the ideal of homogeniety is appealing, its feasibility is not great,
especially in the developing countries of Asia and Africa. The
legal and technical problems beyond the moral, sociological and
cultural problems of shifting borders and populations to achieve
a homogeneous population place the ideal far beyond practicality.
Still, given the above considerations, it can be argued that
a state cannot impose restrictions aimed specifically at a group,
race, nationality, etc., with a view to denying them the right to
move freely among countries on a discriminatory basis.
It must be noted here that the problems being dealt with
are not unique to 13(2). They affect all human rights. Discrim-
ination is an illusive concept. First, it is difficult to define since
it must depend in large part upon the situation in which it
occurs. Second, once it is defined such discrimination is often
difficult to "prove." Perceptions of situations differ greatly.
And since discrimination is a social, cultural, or as some say an
innate pattern of behavior, a listing of basic human rights can
only deal with the manifestations of discrimination. Actual dis-
crimination cannot be dealt with by international covenants.
But these covenants can lessen the areas in which the mani-
25 See generally, W.M. KULSKI, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN A REVOLU-
TIONARY AGE 1-2 (1968); A.F.K. ORGANSKI, WORLD POLITICS 21 (2d ed.
1968),; J. STOESSINGER, THE MIGHT OF NATIONS 8-10 (1965).
20 New York Times, July 14, 1970, at 3, col. 4.
- Id., Sept. 5, 1970, at 3, col. 1.
"' Id., Oct. 15, 1970, at 11, col. 1.
2, Id., Aug. 2, 1970, at 1, col. 7.
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festations of discrimination are acceptable. The problems of
determining discriminatory behavior are then alike for all
human rights.
A state's denial to its citizens of access to other countries
and its refusal to accept citizens of other states within its bor-
ders, may not in and of itself be discriminatory. Imposing
restrictions such as visas, health controls, monetary payments,
etc., can be appropriate in one situation and perhaps discrim-
inatory in another. Promotion of trade and travel and the en-
suing economic benefits are a part of this picture as are travel
regulations for refugees, migratory laborers and stateless per-
sons. What are appropriate formalities and requirements? Are
there time limitations? What are the grounds for rejection? Once
issued, can a state refuse to honor such documents? Can a state,
after permitting travel, deny re-entry? Do the same rules apply
to citizens and foreigners or resident aliens? Should treatment
accorded individuals be different from that accorded groups?
If so, in what way? How should one view this freedom in terms
of population growth? What is the relation to economic viability?
These factors and considerations, social, economic, political,
must be part of the input into a discussion on the implementa-
tion of the right of movement and travel abroad. Each situation
puts forth a myriad of complex and sometimes contradictory
aspects. But implementation, to be successful, must be viewed
in the broadest of contexts. The scope here is all encompassing
within the perspective of restrictive measures whose purpose
is to effectuate discriminatory policies.
III. DIFFICULTIES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGHT
It is this broad and rather illusive perspective, and its vari-
ety of credible and varying interpretations which tend to make
this right appear ambiguous and, therefore, difficult if not impos-
sible to implement. This, together with the differing criteria a
state may apply to determine the nature and extent of these
rights- that of a national to leave his country and that of a
foreigner to leave the country of his sojourn - and that it might
treat both these rights differently from the right of its national
to return to his country reinforce the difficulties of implementa-
tion. Another equally important problem is the existence of
direct and indirect state limitations on the enjoyment of this
right, limitations which are hard to substantiate because
administrative procedures granting, denying or restricting this
right might be so discretionary as to allow little or no recourse
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to further appeal or judicial review. Thus a de jure existence
of the right would certainly not imply that it does exist de
facto as well. Furthermore, a state might couch its discrimina-
tory practices in legalistic framework. Therefore, although the
state practice would amount in fact to "discrimination" in the
enjoyment of the right as provided in articles 2 and 29(2) of the
Universal Declaration, it would be hard to prove, due to indi-
rect restrictions administered under regulations and procedures
which provide for nondiscriminatory application but are in
reality administered in a discriminatory fashion.
It is appropriate at this point to note that article 2 of the
Declaration provides in its relevant part: "Everyone is entitled
to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status. '30 ) Article 29(2) provides:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely
for the purpose of securing due recogniticn and respect for the
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just require-
ments of morality, public order and the general welfate in a
democratic society.
31
While article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights is identical in content to article 2 of the
Declaration, article 12(3) of the Covenant provides:
The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to. any restric-
tions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to
protect national security, public order (ordre public), public
health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are
consistent with the other rights recognized in the present
Covenant.32
Of note are the additions of national security, ordre public
and public health in article 12(3) of the Covenant to the limi-
tations already mentioned in article 29(2) of the Declaration,
and the deletion therefrom of the concept of "general welfare."
The civil law concept of ordre public is generally considered
broader in scope and more flexible than its counterpart in
common law, public order; while the former is closer to public
policy, the latter means absence of disorder.
Thus, while the right encompassed in article 12 of the Cove-
nant is to be enjoyed without any distinction based on "race,
color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status," there is ample
310 Universal Declaration, supra note 7, at 34.
31 Id., at 38.
32 See supra note 24.
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reason to believe that any one or more of the bases of distinc-
tion enumerated here could be used by a state to prevent a
national from leaving his own country, to prevent a foreigner
from leaving the country of his sojourn, or to prevent a national
from returning to his own country.33 For instance, passport
facilities could be denied to persons belonging to an ethnic
group or to a political party as has been the case in South
Africa. Similarly, restrictions could be imposed on persons for
various reasons, such as some special status- that of a married
woman or a divorcee- or on linguistic, religious or political
grounds- for example, alleged restrictions on Jews in the So-
viet Union-or for reasons of national or social origin-for
instance, restrictions on American citizens of Japanese descent
during World War II- or on considerations based on property,
birth, or other status.
The Covenant allows a state to impose limitations on the
right of everyone to leave any country, including his own, and
to return to his country, if such limitations are "provided by
law" and are necessary to protect national security, public order
(ordre public), public health or morals, or the rights and free-
dom of others. In his study Ingles discusses passport and visa
restrictions based on state interest, especially public emergency;
legal incapacity; nonperformance of legal obligations and pro-
fessional skill.3 4 Among indirect limitations, Ingles discusses
economic measures such as forbidding or restricting the exporta-
tion of currency as well as the high cost of obtaining travel
documents.3 5 Also, in some states, the procedures and conditions
for obtaining a passport might be so complex as to render the
exercise of the right to leave the country extremely difficult.
3
,
In addition, the exercise of the right to travel would be affected
by (1) administrative and legislative remedies available to an
aggrieved national who claims that his rights have been unduly
restricted, 37 and (2) the imposition of penal or other sanctions
upon the persons who might be found to have violated the
state requirements on international travel.38 As noted previously
in Section II problems of implementing sanctions on discrimina-
tory actions are not unique here. Implementation can at best be
directed toward outward manifestations of discrimination.
33 See generally Ingles report, at 20-35.
34 See id., at 41-46.
35 Id., at 47-49.
38 Id., at 49-51.
3 Id., at 51-53.
88 Id., at 53-55.
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IV. TRENDS AS REFLECTED BY STATES' PRACTICES IN RECOGNIZING
AND LIMITING THE RIGHT
The 1963 Ingles study was prepared on the basis of an ex-
tensive survey resulting in responses from 90 countries as well
as information on 22 additional countries. Thus the study takes
into account as many as 112 states. In addition information was
solicited from selected non-governmental organizations in con-
sultative status and specialized agencies.39 The responses show
that about one-third of the countries explicitly recognize the
right in question. It is appropriate to cite the report:
(a) The right of a national to leave his country. In twenty-
four countries the right is formally recognized in constitutional
texts or laws and in twelve countries by judicial, interpretation.
Fifty countries do not expressly recognize the right in their
legislation.
(b) The right of a national to return to his country. In twenty-
four countries the right is formally recognized in constitutional
texts or laws and in twelve countries by judicial interpretation.
Forty-nine countries do not expressly recognize the right in
their legislation.
(c) The right of a non-national to leave the country of his so-
journ. In twenty countries the right is formally recognized in
constitutional texts or laws and in four countries by judicial
interpretation. Fifty-six countries do not expressly recognize the
right in their legislation. 4 0
Of course, the conclusion is not warranted that the absence
of legal recognition negates the existence of the right, or con-
versely that formal recognition ensures its enjoyment. For while
a number of countries
which do not have any constitutional or legislative provision or
judicial precedent governing this question have stated that they
recognize it "in principle," "as a rule of law," "in general prac-
tice," "according to regulations," "as an enforceable right," "al-
ways," or that "there is no authority for denial." This is par-
ticularly true as regards the right of a national to return to his
39 The Secretary-General had in April 1960 sent a circular letter to all
governments of states members of the U.N. and members of specialized
agencies seeking their assistance in the preparation of the study, and
adding that the Special Rapporteur would appreciate "having any rele-
vant material, including the texts of laws, administrative arrangements,
judicial decisions and statistical data," (Ingles report, at 77-78) as
well as information on specific points sought by the Special Rapporteur.
Two more circular letters, one in 1961 and the second in 1962, were sent
by the Secretary-General to all governments which had not responded
to the inquiry. The Director of the Division of Human Rights had in
April 1960 made a similar request for assistance to 117 selected non-
governmental organizations (Ingles report, at 76); this was followed
by another letter in March 1962 to those organizations which had not
responded to the first.
4 o Ingles report, at 4. In 4 countries on point a, in 5 countries on point b,
and in 10 countries on point c no information available.
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country, which has thus been informally recognized by sixteen
additional countries.
41
Since the report had not been considered by the Commis-
sion in several years, in June 1970, the Secretary-General, per-
suant to a request by the Sub-Commission, sent a note verbale
to governments of member states "requesting them to furnish
information on new developments in fields covered by the study
of discrimination in respect of the right of everyone to leave
any country, including his own, and to return to his country. "42
Of the replies received from 27 states until February 1971,
43
12 (Cyprus, 44 France,45 Guatemala, 46 Jamaica, 47 Lebanon,", Nic-
aragua, 4  Nigeria, 50  Poland,51 Sierra Leone,52  Singapore,
53
Syria,54 and Turkey55) indicated that no new developments had
occurred since their earlier communications. Among others,
Austria56 and Luxembourg 57 referred to their ratification of
Protocol 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights; Ar-
gentina58 to its ratification of the 1967 International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; and
Madagascar 59 to its accession to the 1966 Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Obviously, all these countries were stressing
the fact that since they were parties to the aforementioned con-
ventions, they had therefore obligated themselves to the grant-
ing of the right.
Several countries referred to their constitutional provisions
41 Id., at 5.
42 1970 Note by the Secretary-General, supra note 2, at 6.
43 See 1970 Note by the Secretary-General, Annex [hereinafter cited as
Annex]; Note by the Secretary-General, Addendum, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
1042/Add. 1, 25 Jan. 1971 [hereinafter cited as Add. 1]; and Note by the
Secretary-General, Addendum, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Add. 2, 15 February,
1971 [hereinafter cited as Add. 2].
44 Annex, at 2.
45 Add. 1, at 7.
46 Annex, at 3.
47 Add. 1, at 7.
48 Annex, at 5.
49 Id., at 6.
50 Id., at 7.
51 Add. 1, at 8.
52 Annex, at 7.
53 Id.
54 Add. 1, at 8.
55 Id.
56 Add. 2, at 2.
5 7 Annex, at 5.
58 Id., at 1.
39 Add. 1, at 7-8.
120 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY VOL. 1
guaranteeing the right. They include Barbados,60 Iraq,61 Kenya,62
Malta,63 and Mauritius.64 Afghanistan 5 and Swaziland 66 referred
to their laws providing this right. Denmark 7 is the only country
that reported some added restrictions on travel in the case of
national servicemen who could be liable to be called up in case
of mobilization, while Austria, 8 Italy6" and Sweden 70 reported
special provisions for granting passports to aliens without travel
documents and to stateless persons.
Iraq71 and Italy 72 mentioned "exceptional grounds" and "ex-
ceptional circumstances" respectively among the limitations on
the right to travel abroad; in the former case, the limitation is
on leaving the country, while in the latter, the limitation is on
the right to be issued a passport. In Afghanistan,7 3 the qualifi-
cations to a foreigner's right to enter Afghanistan, travel in
the country and leave it are stated thus: "[e]xceptions apply
only to undesirable persons in accordance with the law. The
principle of reciprocity, in accordance with international law, is
recognized." In Sierra Leone,7 4 the right to leave the country
is not included in the constitutional right guaranteeing freedom
of movement, although it was reported that "there has been no
judicial declaration on such a right" based on the constitutional
provision granting freedom of movement.
75
V. APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS
State practice is varied in respect to granting the right, en-
suring its enjoyment, imposing limitations on it and providing
remedies.76 It would certainly be desirable if some uniformity
were achieved in setting standards and providing remedies. Of
60 Id., at 3-5.
61 Annex, at 3-4.
62 Id., at 4.
63 Id., at 5.
64 Id., at 6.
65 Add. 1, at 2.
66 Annex, at 8.
67 Add. 1, at 6.
68 Id., at 2-3.
69 Add. 2, at 3-5.
70 Annex, at 8.
71 Article 6 of the Passport Law. See Annex, at 4.
72 Add. 2, at 3.
73 Add. 1, at 2.
74 Annex, at 7.
75 Id.
76 On state practices, two incisive articles are: Gould, The Right to Travel
and National Security, 1961 WASH. U. L.Q., 334 (1961); Redish, British
Immigration and International Protection of Human Rights, 10 I-Lv.
INT'L L.J. 150 (1969).
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course, the objective would be to move toward recognition of
the right by every state as well as adoption by states of means
for an effective implementation of the right.
It is realized that if the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights were to come into force and were ratified by a
vast majority of states,77 the right would ipso facto be recog-
nized by the states ratifying the Covenant. However, not only
are the states slow in their ratification,7
8 but even were the
Covenant to be ratified universally and the right to movement
and travel be internationally recognized, the mere recognition
of the right might remain meaningless rhetoric, unless it were
to be accompanied by specific standards, criteria and remedies
for implementation.
The following international measures are proposed as neces-
sary first steps in implementation. (1) The Human Rights Com-
mission should find time at its next session in 1972 to consider
the Ingles report and the more recent developments since the
publication of the report in 1963. (2) A declaration of principles
should be recommended by the Commission to be adopted later
by the Economic and Social Council and finally by the General
Assembly. Such a declaration would offer a comparative set of
standards to every state and would provide an impetus to bring
a state's practice in line with the internationally agreed prin-
ciples.
Such standards could be compiled through the gathering of
relevant statistics and an examination of at least formal govern-
mental practices indicating customs procedures, costs of exit and
entry documents, length of time required to obtain such papers,
and information sought in such forms. A compilation of re-
quirements representing the lowest common denominator should
be offered as a model for initial state compliance. (3) Dis-
semination of information on the nature of the right by the
utilization of all the U.N. resources and machinery, especially
through its advisory services and regional seminars, would be
77 Pursuant to article 27 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and article 49 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights re-
spectively, each of the two covenants will come into force three months
after the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or accession has been
deposited. As of December 1971, Bulgaria, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cyprus,
Ecuador, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Uruguay were the 9 states that had
either ratified or acceded to both these covenants. See Multilateral
Treaties in Respect of which the Secretary-General Performs Depository
Functions: List of Signatures, Ratifications, Accessions, etc. as at 31
December 1970, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.D/4 (1971), a-t 78-82. On Jan-
uary 25, 1971, Iraq ratified the Covenants, becoming the 10th country
to be a party to the two covenants. See 7 UN Monthly Chronicle, No. 2,
Feb. 1971, at 23.
78 Id.
122 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY VOL. 1
useful in encouraging the exercise of the right. Similarly, peri-
odic state reporting to the Human Rights Commission pertaining
to the enjoyment of the right would be desirable. Use of this
information should be made in the compilation of data on popu-
lation patterns and growth of tourism, enumerating purposes
and lengths of international travel and movement and problems
encountered as a result.
(4) Finally, a draft convention on the subject should be
drawn up by the Commission, which could later be adopted by
the General Assembly. Similarly, regional and bilateral conven-
tions facilitating international travel and movement should be
encouraged.
Though tacitly no country acknowledges discriminatory
practices of this nature the persistent denial by South Africa of
passports to blacks wishing to leave for study and travel should
not be ignored, nor can Soviet actions with regard to her Jewish
citizens. But both states have reacted to world pressures and
protests. This reaction indicates that pressure and opinion can
have significant effects and should be exploited for the pur-
poses of implementation.
At this point, no international machinery is envisaged to
compel a state to grant this right to the individual. The en-
couragement of voluntary compliance by a state with the estab-
lished standards should be the primary focus. The importance
of the right to movement and travel abroad should be given
urgent and immediate consideration at the United Nations as
well as at regional and national levels.
